Optimal Design of Financial Contracts and Moral Hazard
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 9219.
Length: 55 pages
Date of creation: 1992
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Other versions of this item:
- Dionne, G. & Viala, P., 1992. "Optimal Design of Financial Contracts and Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche 9219, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
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- Dionne, G. & Gagne, R. & Gagnon, F. & Vanasse, C., 1994.
"Debts, moral hazard and airline safety : an empirica evidence,"
CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange)
- Dionne, Georges & Gagne, Robert & Gagnon, Francois & Vanasse, Charles, 1997. "Debt, moral hazard and airline safety An empirical evidence," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 379-402, August.
- Dionne, G. & Gagne, R. & Gagnon, F. & Vanasse, C., 1993. "Debt, Moral Hazard and Airline Safety : An Empirical Evidence," Cahiers de recherche 9309, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Project Financing when the Principal Cannot Commit," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-29, CIRANO.
- Dionne, Georges & Spaeter, Sandrine, 2003.
"Environmental risk and extended liability: The case of green technologies,"
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Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1025-1060, May.
- Dionne, G. & Spaeter, S., 1998. "Environmental Risk and Extended Liability: the Case of Green Technologies," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 98-12, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
- Arthur Selender & Liang Zou, 1994. "Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: on the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 149-166, June.
- M. Martin Boyer, 2001.
"Contracting under Ex Post Moral Hazard and Non-Commitment,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- M. Boyer, 2003. "Contracting under ex post moral hazard and non-commitment," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 1-38, August.
- Georges Dionne, 2003. "The Foundationsof Banks' Risk Regulation: A Review of Literature," THEMA Working Papers 2003-46, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Stanley D. Longhofer, 1994. "Bankruptcy rules and debt contracting: on the relative efficiency of absolute priority, proportionate priority, and first-come, first-served rules," Working Paper 9415, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Bond, Eric W. & Crocker, Keith J., 1997.
"Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 239-264, January.
- Bond, E.W. & Crocker, K.J., 1993. "Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Verification and Endogenous Monitoring Costs," Papers 10-93-1b, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Martin Hellwig, 2007.
"A Reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling Model of Outside Finance,"
Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2007_8, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Hellwig, Martin F., 2009. "A reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling model of outside finance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 495-525, October.
- Rejesus, Roderick M., 2002. "Ex Post Moral Hazard In Crop Insurance: Costly State Verification Or Falsification?," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19650, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
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