On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games
AbstractWe derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2005-15.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
common orty; natural resources; differential games; linear Markov strategies;
Other versions of this item:
- GAUDET, Gérard & LOHOUES, Hervé, 2005. "On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games," Cahiers de recherche 19-2005, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - General
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2005-09-17 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2005-09-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2005-09-17 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, October.
- Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1992. "Strategic dynamic interaction : Fish wars," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 267-287, April.
- Plourde, Charles & Yeung, David, 1989. "Harvesting of a Transboundary Replenishable Fish Stock: A Noncooperative Game Solution," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 6(1).
- Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
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