On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

Author Info

GAUDET, Gérard
LOHOUES, Hervé

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Gérard Gaudet

Abstract

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2005-15.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2005-15

Contact details of provider:
Postal: CP 6128, Succ. Centre-Ville, Montr�al, Qu�bec, H3C 3J7
Phone: (514) 343-6540
Fax: (514) 343-5831
Web page: http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Sharon BREWER).

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - General
Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-AGR-2005-09-17 (Agricultural Economics)
NEP-ALL-2005-09-17 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2005-09-17 (Game Theory)

This item is featured on the following reading lists:

Socio-economics of Fisheries and Aquaculture

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1996. "The Compleat Fish Wars: Biological and Dynamic Interactions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 34-42, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1992. "Strategic dynamic interaction : Fish wars," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 267-287, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors can create their own profile with links to their works on the RePEc Author Service.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-29.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.