Some Law & Economics Considerations on the EU Pre-Commercial Procurement of Innovation
AbstractAccording to the Lisbon Strategy innovation is considered to be a fundamental element for socio-economic growth in the EU. In particular, since it is estimated to count for about 16-18% of the European GDP, public procurement can be a driving force for this. To support this role in 2007 the EC enacted a Communication to introduce a legal framework for Pre-Commercial Procurement of innovative solutions in the public sector. In the paper we discuss some main Law & Economics issues related to such proposal.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht School of Management in its series Working Papers with number 2012/10.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2012
Date of revision:
Innovation; Public Procurement; Pre-Commercial Solutions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- O3 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights
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