Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence
AbstractWe provide experimental evidence of worker's ingratiation by opinion conformity and of managers' discrimination in favor of workers with whom they share similar opinions. In our Baseline, managers can observe both workers' performance at a task and opinions before assigning unequal payoffs. In the Ingratiation treatment, workers can change their opinion after learning that held by manager. In the Random treatment, workers can also change opinion but payoffs are assigned randomly, which gives a measure of non-strategic opinion conformism. We find evidence of high ingratiation indices, as overall, ingratiation is effective. Indeed, managers rewards opinion conformity, and even more so when opinions cannot be manipulated. Additional treatments reveal that ingratiation is cost sensitive and that the introduction of performance pay for managers as well as a less noisy measure of performance increase the role of relative performance in the assignment of payoffs, without eliminating the reward of opinion conformity.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number 12032.
Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2012
Date of revision:
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Ingratiation; opinion conformity; favoritism; discrimination; social distance; experiment.;
Other versions of this item:
- Stéphane Robin & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Marie Claire Villeval, 2012. "Ingratiation and Favoritism : Experimental Evidence," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00706791, HAL.
- Stéphane Robin & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2012. "Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00694160, HAL.
- Robin, Stéphane & Rusinowska, Agnieszka & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2012. "Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 6530, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Stéphane Robin & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2012. "Ingratiation and Favoritism : Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 1207, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
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