Firm Compliance with Social Insurance Obligations where there is a Weak Surveillance and Enforcement Mechanism: Empirical Evidence from Shanghai
AbstractThis paper draws on a unique data set collected in audits in 2001 and 2002 by the Bureau of Labour and Social Security in Shanghai to examine why firms in Shanghai comply or over-comply with social insurance obligations in a regulatory environment where the expected punishment for non-compliance is low. Drawing on Harrington (1988), we test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that based on the first audit, the BOLSS will segment firms into low (non-aggressive) and high (aggressive) categories and those in the high category will be more likely to be re-audited. The second hypothesis is that if the identified non-complier is re-audited, it will be more likely to comply with its social insurance obligations in order to be returned from the high (aggressive) category into the low (non aggressive) category. Our first main finding is that firms found to be in non-compliance in the first audit in 2001 were moved into a separate violation category and the probability of being reaudited in 2002 was significantly higher if the firm was in that category. Our second main result is that across the board, firms which were reaudited continued to underpay in 2002 but the extent of underpayment was significantly reduced.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Monash University, Department of Economics in its series Monash Economics Working Papers with number 13/05.
Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2005
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, Monash University, Victoria 3800, Australia
Web page: http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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- Nielsen, Ingrid & Smyth, Russell, 2008. "Who bears the burden of employer compliance with social security contributions? Evidence from Chinese firm level data," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 230-244, June.
- Russell Smyth & Ingrid Nielsen & Qingguo Zhai, 2010.
"Personal Well-being in Urban China,"
Social Indicators Research, Springer,
Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 231-251, January.
- Rickne, Johanna, 2013. "Labor market conditions and social insurance in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 52-68.
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