Overcompliance with minimum quality standards
AbstractThis paper presents an unnoticed result that may occur when an effective minimum quality standard is imposed in a duopoly model where firms decide on quality and prices in two stages and where both covered or uncovered markets may be endogenous outcomes of the competition game. We derive situations, associated to transitions induced by the standard from uncovered market to covered market, where the two firms decide to provide a quality level higher than the minimum quality required by the standard (Copyright: Fundación SEPI)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Fundación SEPI in its journal Investigaciones Económicas.
Volume (Year): 28 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Investigaciones Economicas Fundación SEPI Quintana, 2 (planta 3) 28008 Madrid Spain
Web page: http://www.fundacionsepi.es/
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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