This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Evolutionary Foundations of Aggregate-Taking Behavior

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Alex Possajennikov

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite populations in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.wiso.uni-dortmund.de/mik/de/content/forschung/DPSeries/PDF/01-10.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Dortmund, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 01_10.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mik:wpaper:01_10

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Vogelpothsweg 87, D-44227 Dortmund
Phone: +49 +231 755 3182
Fax: +49 +231 755 4375
Web page: http://www.wiso.uni-dortmund.de/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Eva Borchard) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Eva Borchard to update the entry or send us the correct address..

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Birgitte Sloth & Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen, 2006. "Economic Darwinism," CIE Discussion Papers 2006-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Wolfgang Leininger, 2004. "Fending off one means fending off all:evolutionary stability in submodular games," Discussion Papers in Economics 04_03, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Wolfgang Leininger, 2004. "Fending off one Means Fending off all: Evolutionary Stability in Submodular Games," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse35_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Hehenkamp, Burkhard & Leininger, Wolfgang & Possajennikov, Alex, 2001. "Evolutionary Rent-Seeking," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes books.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.