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Welfare Restructuring without Partisan Cooperation: The Role of Party Collusion in Blame Avoidance

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Author Info
Martin Hering

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Abstract

This article argues that welfare state restructuring, which is highly unpopular among voters, is politically feasible if government and opposition parties collude informally with each other. Contrary to key arguments made in the literature, restructuring does not require the formation of a formal grand coalition which diffuses blame from voters. Party collusion is a distinctive blame-avoiding strategy that differs not only from other party-oriented strategies such as building a grand coalition, but also from voter-oriented ones. By analyzing the politics of pension reform in Germany from 1995 to 2004, this article shows that party collusion, which emerges through repeated signaling and informal agreements, enables political parties to restructure the welfare state without running the risk of electoral failure. Finally, it suggests that collusion likely explains recent successes of Austrian, French and Italian governments in legislating unpopular welfare cutbacks.

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File URL: http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~sedap/p/sedap142.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by McMaster University in its series Social and Economic Dimensions of an Aging Population Research Papers with number 142.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:mcm:sedapp:142

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Related research
Keywords: political parties; blame avoidance; collusion; welfare state; pension policy;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-24.

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