Equalization Payments in a Bargaining Model of Tax Competition
AbstractA model in which a high-productivity region and a low-productivity region bargain with each firm in a group of mobile firms is constructed. It differs from the Han and Leach  model in that the firms are identical, so that its comparative statics are more tractable. The model is used to examine the allocative effects of equalization payments (both non-contingent payments and "corrective subsidies"). The equilibrium is characterized by misallocation of capital and underprovision of public goods. Underprovision is more severe in the low-productivity region than the high-productivity region. A transfer of revenue from the high-productivity region to the low-productivity region augments public goods provision in the low-productivity region, allowing that region to make more generous offers to the firms. Likewise, underprovsion becomes more severe in the high-productivity region, so that its offers become less generous. Equilibrium is attained by a movement of firms from the high-productivity region to the low-productivity region, reducing the misallocation of capital.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by McMaster University in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 2008-01.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2008
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2008-02-09 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2008-02-09 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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