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Keeping It Off The Books: An Empirical Investigation Into the Characteristics of Firms That Engage In Tax Non-Compliance

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  • Lindsay M. Tedds

Abstract

We investigate firm tax noncompliance using a survey of firms from around the world. Overall, we find that small firms are less and large firms are more compliant. Foreign owned firms, exporters and firms that have audited finance statements are also more compliant, as found by others, but, quite surprisingly, government ownership is insignificant. Not surprisingly, organized crime, high taxes, and government corruption all result in lower compliance. Finally, we find that firms around the world engage in tax noncompliance but, holding all else constant, compliance in highest in OECD countries and the lowest in Latin American, African & Middle Eastern countries.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by McMaster University in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 2005-01.

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Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2005-01

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Keywords: Underground Economy; Tax Noncompliance; Firm Characteristics; Interval Regression;

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Cited by:
  1. Laszlo Goerke, 2012. "The Optimal Structure of Commodity Taxation in a Monopoly with Tax Avoidance or Evasion," Public Finance Review, , , vol. 40(4), pages 519-536, July.

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