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Auctioning Public Office

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Author Info
Costas Roumanias () (Department of Economics, University of Macedonia)
Abstract

Campaign promises and campaign spending are modelled as integral parts of a signaling mechanism that transmits information about can- didates' abilities and proposed policies to the voters. We suggest that viewing promises and spending as inseparable parts of the same mechanism is essential in moving towards providing a microfoundation framework of political campaigns. Political competition in spending and promising is modeled as an auction which enables us to derive results about the laws governing political campaigns. The degree of commitment is crucial to the mixture of signaling used by candidates.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Macedonia in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 2008_08.

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Date of creation: Sep 2008
Date of revision: Sep 2008
Handle: RePEc:mcd:mcddps:2008_08

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Related research
Keywords: Auctions; Elections; Political Competition; Political Campaigns; Campaign Promises; Campaign Spending.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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  1. Amann, Erwin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1996. "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alesina, Alberto & Spear, Stephen E., 1988. "An overlapping generations model of electoral competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 359-379, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Kenneth Rogoff, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Costas Roumanias, 2005. "Signaling Through Political Campaigns: Elections As A Revelation Mechanism," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(3), pages 367-392, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rogoff, Kenneth & Sibert, Anne, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Prat, Andrea, 2002. "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 162-189, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
  9. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
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  10. Eric Le Borgne & Ben Lockwood, 2002. "Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle," IMF Working Papers 02/48, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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