Auctioning Public Office
AbstractCampaign promises and campaign spending are modelled as integral parts of a signaling mechanism that transmits information about can- didates' abilities and proposed policies to the voters. We suggest that viewing promises and spending as inseparable parts of the same mechanism is essential in moving towards providing a microfoundation framework of political campaigns. Political competition in spending and promising is modeled as an auction which enables us to derive results about the laws governing political campaigns. The degree of commitment is crucial to the mixture of signaling used by candidates.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Macedonia in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 2008_08.
Date of creation: Sep 2008
Date of revision: Sep 2008
Auctions; Elections; Political Competition; Political Campaigns; Campaign Promises; Campaign Spending.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-09-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-09-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2008-09-20 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-PBE-2008-09-20 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2008-09-20 (Positive Political Economics)
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