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Auctioning Public Office

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    Abstract

    Campaign promises and campaign spending are modelled as integral parts of a signaling mechanism that transmits information about can- didates' abilities and proposed policies to the voters. We suggest that viewing promises and spending as inseparable parts of the same mechanism is essential in moving towards providing a microfoundation framework of political campaigns. Political competition in spending and promising is modeled as an auction which enables us to derive results about the laws governing political campaigns. The degree of commitment is crucial to the mixture of signaling used by candidates.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Macedonia in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 2008_08.

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    Date of creation: Sep 2008
    Date of revision: Sep 2008
    Handle: RePEc:mcd:mcddps:2008_08

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    Web page: http://www.uom.gr/index.php?tmima=3

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    Keywords: Auctions; Elections; Political Competition; Political Campaigns; Campaign Promises; Campaign Spending.;

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    1. Alesina, Alberto & Spear, Stephen, 1988. "An Overlapping Generations Model of Electoral Competition," Scholarly Articles 4553015, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Costas Roumanias, 2005. "Signaling Through Political Campaigns: Elections As A Revelation Mechanism," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(3), pages 367-392, November.
    3. Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
    4. Snyder, James M, Jr, 1990. "Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1195-1227, December.
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    6. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1986. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," NBER Working Papers 1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
    8. Prat, Andrea, 1999. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2152, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
    10. Kenneth Rogoff, 1987. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2008. "Vote Buying: General Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 351-380, 04.
    12. Kirkegaard Rene, 2008. "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-32, September.
    13. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    14. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April.
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