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Ist das staatliche Eingreifen ins Gründungsgeschehen theoretisch legitimiert?

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Author Info
Jörn Hendrich Block
Thorsten Staak () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)
Philipp Tilleßen

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Abstract

In der wirtschaftspolitischen Diskussion wird häufig geäußert, für Unternehmensgründer relevante Märkte würden versagen. Folglich müsse der Staat intervenieren, um das Allokationsergebnis zu verbessern. Auf Grundlage der Wohlfahrtstheorie wird in diesem Papier hinterfragt, inwieweit sich Marktversagen im Gründungsgeschehen theoretisch begründen lassen. Als Marktversagensursachen werden dabei Externe Effekte, Asymmetrische Informationen auf Faktor- und Absatzmärkten sowie Unteilbarkeiten betrachtet und auf ihre Bedeutung für den Gründungssektor hin geprüft. Abschließend werden nicht-ökonomische Zielstellungen skizziert, die in der politischen Diskussion als Rechtfertigung für einen Staatseingriff in den Gründungssektor hervorgebracht werden.

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File URL: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/femm/a2007_Dateien/2007_07.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 07007.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:07007

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Related research
Keywords: Externe Effekte; Asymmetrische Information; Unteilbarkeiten; distributives Marktversagen;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship

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