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Ist das staatliche Eingreifen ins Gründungsgeschehen theoretisch legitimiert?

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Author Info

  • Jörn Hendrich Block
  • Thorsten Staak

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

  • Philipp Tilleßen

Abstract

In der wirtschaftspolitischen Diskussion wird häufig geäußert, für Unternehmensgründer relevante Märkte würden versagen. Folglich müsse der Staat intervenieren, um das Allokationsergebnis zu verbessern. Auf Grundlage der Wohlfahrtstheorie wird in diesem Papier hinterfragt, inwieweit sich Marktversagen im Gründungsgeschehen theoretisch begründen lassen. Als Marktversagensursachen werden dabei Externe Effekte, Asymmetrische Informationen auf Faktor- und Absatzmärkten sowie Unteilbarkeiten betrachtet und auf ihre Bedeutung für den Gründungssektor hin geprüft. Abschließend werden nicht-ökonomische Zielstellungen skizziert, die in der politischen Diskussion als Rechtfertigung für einen Staatseingriff in den Gründungssektor hervorgebracht werden.

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File URL: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/femm/a2007_Dateien/2007_07.pdf
File Function: First version, 2007
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 07007.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:07007

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Keywords: Externe Effekte; Asymmetrische Information; Unteilbarkeiten; distributives Marktversagen;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Levering, Britta & Schlömer-Laufen, Nadine, 2012. "Öffentliche Förderung von Unternehmensübernahmen: Notwendigkeit und Ausgestaltung," IfM-Materialien 219, Institut für Mittelstandsforschung (IfM) Bonn.

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