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Tax Policy and Entrepreneurship in the Presence of Asymmetric Information in Capital Markets

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Author Info
Clemens Fuest ()
Bernd Huber ()
Philipp Tillessen ()

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Abstract

This paper considers the implications of asymmetric information in capital markets for entrepreneurial entry and tax policy. In many countries, governments subsidize the creation of new firms. One possible justification for these subsidies is that capital markets for the financing of new firms do not function properly. We analyse this issue by assuming that entrepreneurs need outside financing for their projects and know more about the quality of their projects than outside investors. Entrepreneurs have the choice between carrying out their entrepreneurial projects or working as an employee. It turns out that asymmetric information in capital markets leads to too much rather than too little entrepreneurial entry. Therefore, the ptimal tax policy should discourage rather than subsidize entrepreneurial entry. We also nalyse the welfare effects of project screening and show that there is too much screening. Our policy conclusion is that subsidies for the foundation of firms must be based on reasons other than informational asymmetries in capital markets.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 872.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_872

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gale, William G., 1990. "Federal lending and the market for credit," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 177-193, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  3. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Christian Keuschnigg & Soren Bo Nielsen, 2001. "Public Policy for Venture Capital," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Roger Gordon, 1998. "Can High Personal Tax Rates Encourage Entrepreneurial Activity?," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 45(1), pages 2. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. William G. Gale, 1988. "Federal Lending and the Market for Credit," UCLA Economics Working Papers 504, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, 2000. " Public Policy toward Entrepreneurship," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 283-91, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. de Meza, David & Webb, David C, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 281-92, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, 1999. "What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?," NBER Working Papers 6906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. De Meza, David & Webb, David C., 1988. "Credit market efficiency and tax policy in the presence of screening costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-22, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Keuschnigg, Christian & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2002. "Start-ups, Venture Capitalists and the Capital Gains Tax," CEPR Discussion Papers 3263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber & Søren Bo Nielsen, . "Why Is the Corporate Tax Rate Lower than the Personal Tax Rate?," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-17, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Boadway, Robin & Sato, Motohiro, 1999. " Information Acquisition and Government Intervention in Credit Markets," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 283-308. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. de Meza, David & Webb, David, 2000. "Does credit rationing imply insufficient lending?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 215-234, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Gebhardt, Georg & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen," Discussion Papers in Economics 31, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Keuschnigg, Christian & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2003. "Tax policy, venture capital, and entrepreneurship," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 175-203, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 2004. "Financing New Investments under Asymmetric Information: A General Approach," Working Papers 1017, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Robin Boadway & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2003. "Public Economics and Startup Entrepreneurs," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jörn Hendrich Block & Thorsten Staak & Philipp Tilleßen, 2007. "Ist das staatliche Eingreifen ins Gründungsgeschehen theoretisch legitimiert?," FEMM Working Papers 07007, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
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