Despite the complexity of the first price auction in the general asymmetric case, analytical results have started to emerge in the literature. Authors have searched to gain insights by computing numerical estimates of the equilibria for some particular probability distributions of the valuations. This paper proves that the Nash equilibrium of the first price auction depends continuously, for the weak topology, on the valuation distributions and thus brings robustness to the numerical results as well as some theoretical results. As an example of application, we disprove a conjecture of comparative statics.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info

Paper provided by Université Laval - Département d'économique in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 9922.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:lvl:laeccr:9922

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Pavillon J.A. De S�ve, Qu�bec, Qu�bec, G1K 7P4
Phone: (418) 656-5122
Fax: (418) 656-2707
Email:
Web page: http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Johanne Perron).

Related research

Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc also has a blog.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-15.