Bernard Lebrun (Department of Economics, York University)
Abstract
If the value cumulative distribution functions are log-concave at the highest lower extremity of their supports of the first-price auction in the asymmetric indepent private values model.
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Paper provided by York University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
2004_03.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Kenneth Hendricks & Robert Porter, 1989.
"Collusion in Auctions,"
Discussion Papers
817, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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