Training Costs and Wage Differentials in the Theory of Job Competition
AbstractA labor market is considered that is characterized by job competition over job ladders. Firms paying more for comparable jobs can attract workers with better background characteristics (with general human capital) and will lose fewer trained workers (with general and firm-specific human capital). Optimizing behavior on the side of the firms gives rise to a wage structure that shows similar correlations between training and wages as would emerge in a human capital framework, but for different reasons. Further, the wage structure responds to other influences, like the degree of labor mobility.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Munich Reprints in Economics with number 1347.
Date of creation: 1981
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 2 137(1981): pp. 212-21
job competition; human capital; job ladders; specific training; general training; efficiency wages; turnover; wage structure;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
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