Reference Group Behaviour and Economic Incentives: A Remark
AbstractPeople tend, in many ways, to behave like the others they see around them. This note´shows that such reference group behavior tends to reinforce incentives (economic or other) that influence individuals directly only marginally. The workings or such incentives is augmented what might be called a "social multiplier."
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Munich Reprints in Economics with number 4183.
Date of creation: 1981
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft) 137 1(1981): pp. 125-127
reference group; incentives; conformity; social multiplier; aggregation;
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- Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1981. "Training Costs and Wage Differentials in the Theory of Job Competition," Munich Reprints in Economics 1347, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Schlicht, Ekkehart, 2014. "Two Additional Remarks on Conformism," Discussion Papers in Economics 18376, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Kostov, Philip & Lingard, John, 2005. "Disentangling the Social and Economic Dimensions of Agricultural Behaviour: What Role for Institutions and Social Capital?," 94th Seminar, April 9-10, 2005, Ashford, UK 24436, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Galbiati, Roberto & Zanella, Giulio, 2012. "The tax evasion social multiplier: Evidence from Italy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 485-494.
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