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Political Institutions and Public Policy: The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union and the Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy


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  • Christophe Crombez
  • Johan F.M. Swinnen


In this paper we study the implications of the introduction of the co-decision procedure for the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy and its reform. We use a game-theoretical model of the legislative procedures in the European Union and show that the move from consultation to co-decision implies a shift of power from the Commission to the European Parliament. The implications for the Common Agricultural Policy depend on the configuration of preferences, the location of the status quo, and the bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee. If the member states and the European Parliament are more opposed to reform than is the Commission, the introduction of co-decision reduces the prospects for reform of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy.

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Paper provided by LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven in its series LICOS Discussion Papers with number 28611.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:lic:licosd:28611

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  8. David Earnshaw & David Judge, 1997. "The Life and Times of the European Union's Co-operation Procedure," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 543-564, December.
  9. Richard Corbett & Francis Jacobs & Michael Shackleton, 2003. "The European Parliament at Fifty: A View from the Inside," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 353-373, 04.
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