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Examining the EU Legislative Process

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  • Thomas König

    (University of Konstanz, Germany)

  • Mirja Pöter

    (University of Konstanz, Germany)

Abstract

This comparative case study tries to offer an empirical insight into the explanatory power of competing approaches on parliamentary influence in the cooperation procedure of the European Union. The theoretical debate on the impact of the cooperation procedure has received remarkable attention and centres around the relative importance of parliamentary agenda-setting and veto powers. Our comparative analysis reveals two important conceptual differences among the competing approaches on parliamentary power: first in their focus on the preference profile and, second, in their modelling of the reference point. The empirical findings show that the supranational preference profile characterizes the actor configuration in European legislative politics, at either the dimensional or the issue level of Commission proposals. The competing approaches overestimate supranational agenda-setting power and parliamentary veto power is unlikely to strengthen the pro-integrationist influence.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas König & Mirja Pöter, 2001. "Examining the EU Legislative Process," European Union Politics, , vol. 2(3), pages 329-351, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:2:y:2001:i:3:p:329-351
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116501002003004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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