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Sequential Capacity and Price Choices in a Duopoly Model with Demand Uncertainty

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Author Info
Morten Hviid (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of demand uncertainty in a two-stage duopoly model where firms first choose capacity then price, and shows that the equilibrium is sensitive to the decision structure of the model. If both the capacity choice and the price choice are made simultaneously, no pure strategy equilibrium exists. If prices are chosen sequentially, the pricing stage has two pure strategy equilibria, but only for one of these does a pure strategy equilibrium of the full game exist. Finally, if both capacities and prices are chosen sequentially, a pure strategy equilibrium with strong first mover advantages exists.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 89-09.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Mar 1989
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift für Nationalokonomie, 1990, 51(2) pp 121-144
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:8909

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Keywords: market structure; industrial organization and corporate strategy;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Deneckere, Raymond J & Kovenock, Dan, 1992. "Price Leadership," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 143-62, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Raymond Deneckere & Dan Kovenock, 1988. "Price Leadership," Discussion Papers 773, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Steve Dowrick, 1986. "von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly: Choosing Roles," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 251-260, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1986. "Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 238-260, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Morten Hviid, 1989. "A Two Stage Duopoly Model with Demand Uncertainty," Discussion Papers 89-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  5. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-53, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Dixon, Huw, 1984. "The existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in a price-setting oligopoly with convex costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 16(3-4), pages 205-212. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. de Frutos, Maria-Angeles & Fabra, Natalia & Von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik M, 2008. "Investment Incentives and Auction Design in Electricity Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 6626, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bergman, Mats A., 1998. "Endogenous Timing of Investments Yields Modified Stackelberg Outcomes," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 272, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jan A. Miegham & Maqbool Dada, 1997. "Capacity Investment under Demand Uncertainty: Price vs. Quantity Competition," Discussion Papers 1204, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Farm, Ante, 2009. "Market Sharing and Price Leadership," Working Paper Series 3/2009, Swedish Institute for Social Research. [Downloadable!]
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