Can Ambiguity in Electoral Competition be Explained by Projection Effects in Voters' Perceptions?
AbstractStudies in political science and psychology suggest that voters' perceptions of political positions depend on their personal views of the candidates. A voter who likes/dislikes a candidate will perceive his position as closer to/further from his own than it really is (projection). Clearly these effects should be most pronounced when candidate positions are ambiguous. Thus a generally well liked candidate will have an incentive to take an ambiguous position. In this paper we construct a simple model to see under which conditions this incentive survives in the strategic setting of electoral competition, even if voters dislike ambiguity per se.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 05-25.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2005
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
electoral competition; ambiguity; voter perception; cognitive balance; projection;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2005-12-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MKT-2005-12-20 (Marketing)
- NEP-POL-2005-12-20 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Enriqueta Aragonés & Zvika Neeman, 1994.
"Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition,"
Economics Working Papers
162, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 1996.
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