Pork barrel politics, voter turnout, and inequality: An experimental study
AbstractWe experimentally study pork barrel politics in two-candidate majoritarian elections. Candidates form distinct supporter groups by favoring some voters in budget spending at the expense of others. We compare voluntary and compulsory costly voting and find that, on average, the former mode induces more narrowly targeted favors and therefore more inequality among otherwise identical voters. When the same candidates act over many elections, such as with parties, they tend to cultivate policy polarization by frequently favoring their exclusive supporters again and avoiding those of the opponent, and with compulsory voting we find additional frequent policy overlap for a separate subset of voters. Our findings are important for understanding how an inclination towards a sustained "divided society" can arise purely from the political process, absent of any coordination devices such as ideological preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Cologne, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics with number 70.
Date of creation: 31 Jan 2014
Date of revision:
Pork barrel politics; voter turnout; inequality; Colonel Blotto games; laboratory experiments;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-02-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2014-02-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2014-02-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2014-02-08 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Colin M. Campbell, 1999. "Large Electorates and Decisive Minorities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1199-1217, December.
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