Providing negative cost public projects under a fair mechanism: An experimental analysis
AbstractThis paper experimentally examines a procedurally fair provision mech- anism allowing members of a small community to determine, via their bids, which of four alternative public projects to implement. Previous experi- ments with positive cost projects have demonstrated that the mechanism is efficiency enhancing. Our experiment tests whether the mechanism re- mains conducive to efficiency when negative cost, but less efficient, projects are made available. We find that this is not the case. On the other hand, we detect no significant difference in bid levels depending on whether mixed feelings are present or absent, and on whether the others' valuations are known or unknown.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2013-021.
Date of creation: 13 May 2013
Date of revision:
Public projects; Bidding behavior; Procedural fairness; Experiment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-05-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-05-19 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2013-05-19 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-05-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PBE-2013-05-19 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2013-05-19 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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