The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents

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The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents

Author Info

Stefan Behringer () (Economics Department, Frankfurt University)

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Stefan Behringer

Abstract

This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framework as the number of agents gets large. A canonical example for a public good that is produced with a direct provision technology is Open Source Software.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by JEPS in its series JEPS Working Papers with number 05-007.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:jep:wpaper:05007

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Paper
- Behringer, Stefan, 2008. "The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents," MPRA Paper 11796, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-01-24 (All new papers)
NEP-PBE-2006-01-24 (Public Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2008. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," NBER Working Papers 13797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2003. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1441R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Apr 2006. [Downloadable!]
Gueth,Werner & Hellwig,Martin, 1986. "The private supply of a public good," Discussion Paper Serie A 40, University of Bonn, Germany.
Other versions:
- Werner Güth & Martin Hellwig, 1986. "The private supply of a public good," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 121-159, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Peter Norman, 2004. "Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
d'Aspremont, Claude & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998. "Knowledge as a public good: efficient sharing and incentives for development effort," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 389-404, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Claude d'Aspremont & Sudipto Battacharya & Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet, 1993. "Knowledge as a Public Good: Efficient Sharing and Incentives for Development Effort," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 93-50, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- D'Aspremont, C. & Bhattacharya, S. & Gerard-Varet, L.A., 1993. "Knowledge as a Public Good: Efficient Sharing and Incentives for Development Effort," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 93a18, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2000. "Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 318-342, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberts, John, 1976. "The incentives for correct revelation of preferences and the number of consumers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 359-374, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lehrer, Ehud & Neeman, Zvika, 2000. "The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(2), pages 309-26, April.
Martin F. Hellwig, 2003. "Public-Good Provision with Many Participants," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(3), pages 589-614, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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