The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents
AbstractThis paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framework as the number of agents gets large. A canonical example for a public good that is produced with a direct provision technology is Open Source Software.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by JEPS in its series JEPS Working Papers with number 05-007.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2005
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://jeps.repec.org/
Mechanism design; public goods; open source software;
Other versions of this item:
- Behringer, Stefan, 2008. "The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents," MPRA Paper 11796, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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