Vertikale Integration und informations- und kommunikationsintensive Dienstleistungen
AbstractThe ongoing debate on the ``service gap'' in Germany has lead to empirical findings bolstering the argument of a lack of outsourcing activities.Hence, there is still a need to back these findings from an organisational point of view. After a short overview on empirical findings, the present paper focuses on the impact of information and communication technologies (ICTs) inside organizations providing ICT-related services. Starting with the organizational literature it shows that ICTs may lower the monitoring costs within incentive contracts. In addition, the paper tries to develop a viewpoint on the degree of applicability of hierarchies as a sefeguard against risks stemming from the outsourcing of ICT-related activities. Thus it tries to shed some light on the explanations for an in-house production of ICT-related services.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultïät in its series Working Paper Series B with number 1999-08.
Date of creation: 01 Dec 1999
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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