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The stagnation effect and the individually strict monotonic path solutions

Author

Listed:
  • Jaume Garcia-Segarra

    (LEE & Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón)

  • Miguel Gines-Vilar

    (LEE & Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón)

Abstract

Several bargaining solutions could fail to capture advantage from having sets closer to the same utopia point. If the whole frontier of the set is improved maintaining the same utopia point, these solutions outcome remains stagnant at the same point. We called this phenomena the stagnation effect. In order to reflect the idea that if the bargaining set is improved maintaining the same utopia point, then, the solution should also be improved, we introduce the utopia continuity axiom. We propose and characterize, for n-agent problems, the family of the individually strict monotonic solutions. This family is a common subset of the family of the strongly monotonic solutions characterized by Thomson and Myerson (1980)[8] and the individually monotonic solutions characterized by Peters and Tijs (1984)[4] and (1985)[5].

Suggested Citation

  • Jaume Garcia-Segarra & Miguel Gines-Vilar, 2012. "The stagnation effect and the individually strict monotonic path solutions," Working Papers 2012/10, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    • Handle: RePEc:jau:wpaper:2012/10
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chun, Youngsub, 1988. "The equal-loss principle for bargaining problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 103-106.
    2. Peters, H.J.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1984. "Individually monotonic bargaining solutions of n-person bargaining games," Other publications TiSEM 94ffcb19-a0bc-4364-a42e-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
    4. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284, Elsevier.
    5. Peters, H.J.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1985. "Characterization of all individually monotonic bargaining solutions," Other publications TiSEM 52f5a6d5-dcac-4fec-9b8e-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; Axiomatization; Efficiency; Monotonicity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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