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Fairness in Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution

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    Abstract

    A bargaining solution guarantees minimal equity if each player's payoff is at least as large as the minimum of the payoffs assigned to him by the equal-gain (i.e., egalitarian) and equal-loss solutions. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is the unique scale-invariant 2-person solution with this property. There does not exist a scale-invariant n-person solution with this property.

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    File URL: http://hevra.haifa.ac.il/econ/wp_files/wp201112.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Haifa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number WP2011/12.

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    Length: 6
    Date of creation:
    Date of revision: 03 Nov 2011
    Handle: RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201112

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    Keywords: Bargaining; fairness; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution;

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