Collective Dismissal Cost, Product Market Competition and Innovation
AbstractCollective dismissal costs are an important part of employment protection legislation (EPL) and make firms' exit more costly. We show in a model with step-by-step innovations that dismissal costs spur innovation if product markets are not too competitive: technologically more advanced firms endogenously exit with smaller probability so that there is a dynamic incentive to innovate. But dismissal costs decrease the absolute value of firms and induce exit. These opposite effects and their dependence on the policy mix of EPL and product market regulation explain why empirical studies have difficulties to find a negative effect of EPL on innovation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 888.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2003
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-10-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2003-10-20 (Development)
- NEP-ENT-2003-10-20 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-IND-2003-10-20 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-INO-2003-10-20 (Innovation)
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