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Measuring "Group Cohesion" to Reveal the Power of Social Relationships in Team Production

Author

Listed:
  • Gächter, Simon

    (University of Nottingham)

  • Starmer, Chris

    (University of Nottingham)

  • Tufano, Fabio

    (University of Nottingham)

Abstract

We introduce "group cohesion" to study the economic relevance of social relationships in team production. We operationalize measurement of group cohesion, adapting the "oneness scale" from psychology. A series of experiments, including a pre-registered replication, reveals strong positive associations between group cohesion and performance assessed in weak-link coordination games, with high-cohesion groups being very likely to achieve superior equilibria. In exploratory analysis, we identify beliefs rather than social preferences as the primary mechanism through which factors proxied by group cohesion influence group performance. Our evidence provides proof-of-concept for group cohesion as a useful tool for economic research and practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Gächter, Simon & Starmer, Chris & Tufano, Fabio, 2022. "Measuring "Group Cohesion" to Reveal the Power of Social Relationships in Team Production," IZA Discussion Papers 15512, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15512
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social relationships; group cohesion; oneness; coordination; weak-link game; experiments; real groups;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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