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Vote Influence in Group Decision-Making: The Changing Role of Justices' Peers on the Supreme Court

Author

Listed:
  • Mindock, Maxwell R.

    (University of Oregon)

  • Waddell, Glen R.

    (University of Oregon)

Abstract

We consider the voting behavior of Supreme Court Justices, finding evidence of co-dependencies in their votes. Coincident with changes in the party imbalance of the Court over time, sharp discontinuities in these dependencies are evident. Overall, the patterns suggest a tradeoff between co-dependencies around political affiliations and individual ideologies, with more-equal party representation on the Court encouraging greater party awareness in Justice voting, and less-equal party representation allowing Justices across party lines but with similar ideologies to inform each other's votes.

Suggested Citation

  • Mindock, Maxwell R. & Waddell, Glen R., 2019. "Vote Influence in Group Decision-Making: The Changing Role of Justices' Peers on the Supreme Court," IZA Discussion Papers 12317, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12317
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Supreme Court; voting; judicial behavior; spatial econometrics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models

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