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From party state capture to party business capture - Model feature of Visegrád countries?

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  • Miklós Szanyi

    (Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

Abstract

The FDI-led development path of the Visegrád countries has been queried most recently. The paper analyses one of the potential reasons of this strategic turn: the struggle between political elites. One elite was bound to the strong presence of multinational business and the institutions of the “competition state”. Their positions were challenged by another political elite that allied mainly with local bourgeoisie. One main arena of conflicts is the economy where political elites try to widen their influence in order to gain financial support. New forms of rent seeking and corruption became possible after the V4 accession to the EU when the flow of financial aid increased. Aid was channeled to partisan firms in public procurement tenders that made legal corruption possible. Political and social control over this practice declined with the demise of classic program parties’ role in politics and the raise of populist “business firm” political parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Miklós Szanyi, 2016. "From party state capture to party business capture - Model feature of Visegrád countries?," IWE Working Papers 226, Institute for World Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:iwe:workpr:226
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    File URL: https://vgi.krtk.hu/publikacio/no-226-2016-11/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mlklós Szanyi & András Boros-Kazai, 1996. "Adaptive Steps by Hungary's Industries during the Transition Crisis," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(5), pages 59-77, October.
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    3. Dorottya Sallai & Gerhard Schnyder, 2015. "Strong State, Weak Managers: How Firms Cope with Autocracy in Hungary," Working Papers wp474, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    4. Miklós Szanyi, 2016. "The Reversal of the Privatisation Logic in Central European Transition Economies (An Essay)," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 66(1), pages 33-55, March.
    5. Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1996. "A Theory of Privatisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 309-319, March.
    6. David Stark & Balazs Vedres, 2012. "Political Holes in the Economy: The Business Network of Partisan Firms in Hungary," Journal of Economic Sociology, National Research University Higher School of Economics, vol. 13(4), pages 19-47.
    7. Andrzej Rapaczynski, 1996. "The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 87-103, Spring.
    8. Miklos Szanyi, 2003. "An FDI-based development model for Hungary - new challenges?," IWE Working Papers 141, Institute for World Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    9. D. Stark, 1996. "Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, vol. 6.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Miklós Szanyi, 2018. "Varieties Of State Capitalism," Global Economic Observer, "Nicolae Titulescu" University of Bucharest, Faculty of Economic Sciences;Institute for World Economy of the Romanian Academy, vol. 6(2), pages 140-146, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Visegrád countries; rent seeking; legal corruption; business capture; elites;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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