The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights
AbstractUsing the experiences of Eastern Europe as an example, this article argues that, contrary to the economists' assumption that property rights are a precondition of a market economy, market institutions are often a prerequisite for a viable private property regime. Progress in the development of complex property rights in Eastern Europe, thus, cannot be expected to come primarily from a perfection of the legal system. Instead, it is more likely to arise as a market response to the demand for property rights. Indeed, legal entitlements can only be expected to become effective against a background of self-enforcing market mechanisms.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Volume (Year): 10 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- P21 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
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