Markov-Perfect Rent Dissipation in Rights-Based Fisheries
AbstractWe present a general, dynamic model of within-season harvesting competition in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas. Markov-Perfect equilibrium harvesting and quota purchase strategies are derived using numerical collocation methods. We identify rent loss caused by a heterogeneous-in-value fish stock, congestion on the fishing ground, revenue competition and stock uncertainty. Our results show that biological, technological and market conditions under which rents will be dissipated in a standard individual transferable quota program are fairly special. These fi ndings provide new insights for designing rights-based programs capable of generating resource rent in marine fisheries.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 33820.
Date of creation: 24 Jun 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Marine Resource Economics, June 2013, vol. 28 no. 2, pp. 111-131
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
More information through EDIRC
Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium; individual transferable quotas; production externalities; resource rent.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cancino, Jose P. & Uchida, Hirotsugu & Wilen, James E., 2007. "TURFs and ITQs: Collective vs. Individual Decision Making," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 22(4).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Stephanie Bridges) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Stephanie Bridges to update the entry or send us the correct address.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.