„Zombierennen“ und „Patenonkel“ - Warum deutsche Fussballklubs in der Champions League den Kürzeren ziehen
Abstract
Obwohl die Bundesliga in dem potentiell attraktivsten europäischen Fussballmarkt operiert, ziehen ihre Klubs in der Champions League vor allem gegen die Konkurrenten aus der Premier League systematisch den Kürzeren. Weil Überinvestition gerade nicht durch eine Auflösung der betroffenen Klubs bestraft wird, trägt der Turnierwettbewerb im europäischen Fussball den Charakter eines „Zombierennens“. Klubverfassungen beeinflussen dabei ganz ent-scheidend die Möglichkeiten der Turnierteilnehmer, neue Finanzierungsquellen für den Rüs-tungswettlauf zu erschliessen. An einem prominenten Beispiel, den „Geldspritzen“ so genann-ter „Patenonkel“ wird der gegenwärtige Wettbewerbsnachteil der über Vereinsverfassungen kontrollierten Bundesliga-Mannschaften detailliert herausgearbeitet.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU) in its series Working Papers with number 0124.Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iso:wpaper:0124
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Plattenstrasse 14, CH-8032 Zürich
Phone: ++41 1 634 29 27
Fax: ++41 1 634 43 48
Email:
Web page: http://www.isu.uzh.ch
More information through EDIRC
Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Egon Franck, 2010. "„Zombierennen“ und „Patenonkel“ - Warum deutsche Fussballklubs in der Champions League den Kürzeren ziehen," Working Papers 0036, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA).
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Egon Franck, .
"Private Firm, Public Corporation or Member`s Association – Governance Structures in European Football,"
Working Papers
0106, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
- Egon Franck, 2010. "Private Firm, Public Corporation or Member’s Association Governance Structures in European Football," International Journal of Sport Finance, Fitness Information Technology, vol. 5(2), pages 108-127, May.
- Akerlof, George A, 1976. "The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 599-617, November.
- Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "The Economics of Superstars," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 845-58, December.
- Helmut M. Dietl & Egon Franck & Markus Lang, 2008.
"Overinvestment In Team Sports Leagues: A Contest Theory Model,"
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(3), pages 353-368, 07.
- Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Markus Lang, 2005. "Overinvestment in Team Sports Leagues: A Contest Theory Model," Working Papers 0038, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised 2007.
- Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Markus Lang, 2005. "Overinvestment in Team Sports Leagues: A Contest Theory Model," Working Papers 0002, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA), revised 2007.
- Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Patrick, 2003. "Überinvestitionsprobleme in einer Sportliga," Working Papers 0020, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Markus Lang & Martin Grossmann & Philipp Theiler, 2011.
"The Sugar Daddy Game: How Wealthy Investors Change Competition in Professional Team Sports,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(4), pages 557-577, December.
- Martin Grossmann & Markus Lang & Philipp Theiler, 2010. "The Sugar Daddy's Game: How Wealthy Investors Change Competition in Professional Team Sports," Working Papers 0037, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA), revised Oct 2010.
- Martin Grossmann & Markus Lang & Philipp Theiler, 2010. "The Sugar Daddy's Game: How Wealthy Investors Change Competition in Professional Team Sports," Working Papers 0128, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Oct 2010.
- Markus Lang & Martin Grossmann & Philipp Theiler, 2011. "The Sugar Daddy's Game: How Wealthy Investors Change Competition in Professional Team Sports," Working Papers 1107, International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists, revised Mar 2011.
- Christoph Breuer & Helmut Dietl & Christian WeingŠrtner & Pamela Wicker, 2011.
"The effect of a sports institutionÕs legal structure on sponsorship income: The case of amateur equestrian sports in Germany,"
Working Papers
0043, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA).
- Pamela Wicker & Christian Weingärtner & Christoph Breuer & Helmut Dietl, 2012. "The Effect of a Sports Institution’s Legal Structure on Sponsorship Income: The Case of Amateur Equestrian Sports in Germany," International Journal of Sport Finance, Fitness Information Technology, vol. 7(4), pages 340-357, November.
- Christoph Breuer & Helmut Dietl & Christian WeingŠrtner & Pamela Wicker, 2011. "The effect of a sports institutionÕs legal structure on sponsorship income: The case of amateur equestrian sports in Germany," Working Papers 0146, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iso:wpaper:0124For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Leif Brandes).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

