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Intercreditor Distribution in Sovereign Debt Restructuring

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  • Mr. Ousmene J Mandeng

Abstract

Intercreditor equity represents one of the main objectives of bankruptcy proceedings. Yet, recent restructurings of sovereign debt suggest that violation of intercreditor equity is common. While existing contractual provisions, and guidelines issued by creditor committees, establish fundamental principles about creditor treatment, they seem to remain too vague to guide debt restructuring processes effectively. The paper focuses on distribution, and argues that lack of clear guidelines for distribution may complicate and delay the resolution process and induce undue uncertainty about the predictability and viability of the restructuring outcome. The paper discusses and proposes parameters which may contribute to establishing explicit principles for the assessment of intercreditor equity in distribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Ousmene J Mandeng, 2004. "Intercreditor Distribution in Sovereign Debt Restructuring," IMF Working Papers 2004/183, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2004/183
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, 2003. "Is Aggregation a Problem for Sovereign Debt Restructuring?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 80-84, May.
    2. Bertola, Giuseppe, 2000. "Macroeconomics of distribution and growth," Handbook of Income Distribution, in: A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (ed.), Handbook of Income Distribution, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 477-540, Elsevier.
    3. Benjamin M. Friedman, 2000. "Debt Restructuring," NBER Working Papers 7722, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Barry Eichengreen, 2003. "Restructuring Sovereign Debt," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 75-98, Fall.
    5. Jeremy Clark, 1998. "Fairness in Public Good Provision: An Investigation of Preferences for Equality and Proportionality," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(3), pages 708-729, August.
    6. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 92(4), pages 671-687.
    7. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aitor Erce, 2012. "Selective sovereign defaults," Globalization Institute Working Papers 127, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    2. Mark Wright, 2018. "The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt," 2018 Meeting Papers 928, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Engelen, Christian & Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2009. "Hares and stags in Argentinean debt restructuring," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 141-148, June.

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