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Sovereign Debt Restructuring: New Articles, New Contracts--Or No Change?

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  • Marcus H. Miller

    ()
    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

Abstract

It was at the National Economists' Club in November 2001 that Anne Krueger, first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund, threw down the gauntlet. "There is," she said, "a gaping hole [in the international financial architecture]-- we lack incentives to help countries with unsustainable debts resolve them promptly and in an orderly way. At present the only available mechanism requires the international community to bail out the private creditors. It is high time this hole was filled."

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Peterson Institute for International Economics in its series Policy Briefs with number PB02-03.

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Date of creation: Apr 2002
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Handle: RePEc:iie:pbrief:pb02-03

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  1. Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 1998. "Sovereign Liquidity Crises: the Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1820, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Ghosal, Sayantan & Miller, Marcus, 2003. "Coordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3729, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Cited by:
  1. Thomas, Jonathan P., 2003. "Bankruptcy Proceedings for Sovereign State Insolvency and their Effect on Capital Flows," Working Paper Series, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  2. Jonathan P. Thomas, 2004. "Bankruptcy Proceedings for Sovereign State Insolvency," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 265-279, 02.
  3. Jose Wynne & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2004. "Renegotiation, Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Markets," 2004 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 7, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Jérôme Sgard, 2003. "Faillite souveraine, négociation privée et nouvelle architecture financière internationale," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/8283, Sciences Po.
  5. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8283 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Kimberly Ann. Elliott & Debayani Kar & J. David Richardson, 2004. "Assessing Globalization’s Critics: “Talkers Are No Good Doers?”," NBER Chapters, in: Challenges to Globalization: Analyzing the Economics, pages 17-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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