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¿Fomentan las democracias conductas de procura de rentas?

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  • César Calderón
  • Alberto Chong

    ()

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) Empleando datos históricos institucionales objetivos, ponemos a prueba el vínculo existente entre el alcance, la duración y la transparencia en las democracias y las conductas de procura de rentas, empleando enfoques de series temporales y datos de panel. En este trabajo nos concentramos en el caso de Uruguay, un país étnicamente homogéneo. Obtuvimos tres resultados principales. En primer lugar, los regímenes democráticos guardan una vinculación negativa con las acciones de procura de rentas. En segundo lugar, mientras más tiempo haya durado una democracia, menos conductas de procura de rentas exhibirá la sociedad. En tercer lugar, la legislación promulgada con mayor transparencia guarda una correlación negativa con conductas de procura de rentas. Nuestros resultados son valederos con el uso de diversos métodos econométricos y con las pruebas de validez básica, y se corresponden con las teorías imperantes.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4416.

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Date of creation: Jun 2005
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4416

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  1. A. Chong & C. Calderón, 2000. "Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 69-81, 03.
  2. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
  3. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-88, November.
  4. Baldwin, Robert E, 1989. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 119-35, Fall.
  5. Sendhil Mullainathan & Marianne Bertrand, 2001. "Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 67-72, May.
  6. Alberto Alesina & Allan Drazen, 1989. "Why are Stabilizations Delayed?," NBER Working Papers 3053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Alberto Chong & Luisa Zanforlin, 2001. "Inward-Looking Policies, Institutions, Autocrats, and Economic Growth in Latin America: An Empirical Exploration," Research Department Publications 4255, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  8. W. J. Henisz, 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, 03.
  9. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
  10. Alberto Chong & Luisa Zanforlin, 2004. "Inward-Looking Policies, Institutions, Autocrats, and Economic Growth in Latin America: An Empirical Exploration," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 335-361, December.
  11. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
  12. Keefer, Philip, 2004. "Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3439, The World Bank.
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