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The Determinants of Protection in Developing Countries: An Extended Interest-Group Approach

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  • Amelung, Torsten

Abstract

The article reveals empirical analysis for the political economy of trade protection in developing countries and emerging economies. Accordingly, industries that are supported by assertive interest groups and are very well organized are likely to be granted a higher degree of protection from imports than others. This paper applies an extended interests-group approach trying to establish a relationship between the organizational capabilities of the interest groups and the outcome in terms of import protection. Using data from Brazil the the model was tested in a cross-sector regression analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Amelung, Torsten, 1989. "The Determinants of Protection in Developing Countries: An Extended Interest-Group Approach," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 42(4), pages 515-532.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:235690
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert E. Baldwin, 1982. "The Political Economy of Protectionism," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 263-292, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2006. "Rent Seeking and Democracy in Latin America: What Drives What?," Research Department Publications 4435, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    2. Diehl, Markus, 1990. "On the determinants of credit allocation in developing countries: Empirical evidence for Brazil and Peru," Kiel Working Papers 451, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Calderón, César & Chong, Alberto E., 2005. "Do Democracies Breed Rent-Seeking Behavior?," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1557, Inter-American Development Bank.
    4. Babacan, Mehmet, 2012. "The Nature of Lobbying and Regulation in Turkey," MPRA Paper 57830, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2005. "¿Fomentan las democracias conductas de procura de rentas?," Research Department Publications 4416, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    6. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2007. "Rent Seeking And Democracy: Empirical Evidence For Uruguay," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(3), pages 592-601, July.
    7. Schweickert, Rainer, 1994. "Regional integration: A worthwhile strategy for catching up?," Kiel Working Papers 623, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    8. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2006. "Búsqueda de rentas y democracia en América Latina: ¿Qué impulsa a qué?," Research Department Publications 4436, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    9. Martín Rama, 1994. "Endogenous Trade Policy: A Time‐Series Approach," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 215-232, November.
    10. Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1990. "Politische Ökonomie des Protektionismus: Ein institutioneller Ansatz," Discussion Papers, Series II 109, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    11. Heather SMITH, 1998. "The Determinants Of Manufacturing Protection In Taiwan," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 36(3), pages 305-331, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Import restrictions; Political economy of trade; Organizational capability of interest groups;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B27 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - International Trade and Finance
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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