Rationalizability in Continuous Games
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp495.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2008
Date of revision:
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- Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003.
"Rationalization and Incomplete Information,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2006.
"Interim Correlated Rationalizability,"
122247000000001188, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Lipman Barton L., 1994. "A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 114-129, January.
- Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
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