Compound Voting and the Banzhaf Power Index
AbstractWe present three axioms for a power index defined on the domain of simple (voting) games. Positivity requires that no voter has negative power, and at least one has positive power. Transfer requires that, when winning coalitions are enhanced in a game, the change in voting power depends only on the change in the game, i.e., on the set of new winning coalitions. The most crucial axiom is composition: the value of a player in a compound voting game is the product of his power in the relevant first-tier game and the power of his delegate in the second-tier game. We prove that these three axioms categorically determine the Banzhaf index.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp333.
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2003
Date of revision:
voting games; Banzhaf power index; compound games; composition axiom;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-09-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2003-09-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2003-09-08 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lehrer, E, 1988. "An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 89-99.
- M. Josune Albizuri & Luis M. Ruiz, 2001. "A new axiomatization of the Banzhaf semivalue," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 97-109.
- Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle, 2000. "- Shapley-Shubik And Banzhaf Indices Revisited," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Pradeep Dubey & Abraham Neyman & Robert J. Weber, 1979. "Value Theory without Efficiency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 513, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Crama, Yves & Leruth, Luc, 2007. "Control and voting power in corporate networks: Concepts and computational aspects," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 178(3), pages 879-893, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ilan Nehama).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.