Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country : An Optimal Taxation Problem with Moral Hazard

Contents:

Author Info

  • Cigno, Alessandro

Abstract

As the return to education (and possibly also parental income) is uncertain, and given that the work a child does covertly for his own parents, and transfers between parents and children, are private information, the government should make school enrollment compulsory, set a legal limit (decreasing in parental income) on overt child labour, and redistribute across families using a flat-rate education grant, and a tax on parental income. That done, it should use a scholarship increasing in school results, and a tax on the skill premium, to raise the expected return to educational investment, and make it less uncertain.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/18493/1/pie_dp474.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series PIE/CIS Discussion Paper with number 474.

as in new window
Length: 16 p.
Date of creation: Apr 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:piecis:474

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi City, Tokyo 186-8603
Phone: +81-42-580-8336
Fax: +81-42-580-8333
Email:
Web page: http://cis.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: child labour; education; uncertainty; moral hazard;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Levhari, David & Weiss, Yoram, 1974. "The Effect of Risk on the Investment in Human Capital," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 950-63, December.
  2. Ranjan, Priya, 2001. "Credit constraints and the phenomenon of child labor," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 81-102, February.
  3. Ravallion, Martin & Wodon, Quentin, 2000. "Does Child Labour Displace Schooling? Evidence on Behavioural Responses to an Enrollment Subsidy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages C158-75, March.
  4. Loury, Glenn C, 1981. "Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 843-67, June.
  5. Fuwa Nobuhiko & Ito Seiro & Kubo Kensuke & Kurosaki Takashi & Sawada Yasuyuki, 2012. "How Does Credit Access Affect Children's Time Allocation?: Evidence from Rural India," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-28, June.
  6. Sylvain E. Dessy & St├ęphane Pallage, 2005. "A Theory of the Worst Forms of Child Labour," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(500), pages 68-87, 01.
  7. Hanushek, Eric & Charles Ka Yui Leung & Kuzey Yilmaz, 2002. "Redistribution through Education and Other Transfer Mechanisms," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 94, Royal Economic Society.
  8. William Pouliot, 2003. "Introducing Uncertainty into Baland and Robinson's Model of Child Labour," Carleton Economic Papers 03-11, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2006.
  9. William R. Johnson, 1987. "Income Redistribution as Human Capital Insurance," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 22(2), pages 269-280.
  10. Townsend, R.M., 1991. "Risk and Insurance in Village India," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 91-3, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
  11. Razin, Assaf, 1976. "Lifetime Uncertainty, Human Capital and Physical Capital," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 439-48, September.
  12. Kodde, David A, 1986. "Uncertainty and the Demand for Education," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 68(3), pages 460-67, August.
  13. Dehejia, Rajeev H. & Beegle, Kathleen & Gatti, Roberta, 2003. "Child labor, income shocks, and access to credit," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3075, The World Bank.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. How to tax covert child labor
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-06-14 14:14:00

Lists

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
  1. Economic Logic blog

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:piecis:474. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.