When Should an Incumbent Be Obliged to Share its Infrastructure with an Entrant Under the General Competition Rules?
AbstractAccording to the essential facilities doctrine, competition law requires an infrastructural monopoly to provide access. Under the ”Bronner criterion”, proposed by the EC Court, the doctrine is only applicable when an infrastructural duopoly is non-viable. This paper uses a simple model to illustrate that, from a welfare point-of-view, the Bronner criterion may provide too little monopoly protection for the incumbent in high-risk new markets, while requiring too much investments from the entrant in moderately mature markets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 2003:25.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 15 Sep 2003
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
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More information through EDIRC
Infrastructure; access regulation; competition law; antitrust; Bronner;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-10-20 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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