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When Should an Incumbent Be Obliged to Share its Infrastructure with an Entrant Under the General Competition Rules?

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  • Bergman, Mats

    ()
    (Göteborg University)

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    Abstract

    According to the essential facilities doctrine, competition law requires an infrastructural monopoly to provide access. Under the ”Bronner criterion”, proposed by the EC Court, the doctrine is only applicable when an infrastructural duopoly is non-viable. This paper uses a simple model to illustrate that, from a welfare point-of-view, the Bronner criterion may provide too little monopoly protection for the incumbent in high-risk new markets, while requiring too much investments from the entrant in moderately mature markets.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 2003:25.

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    Length: 21 pages
    Date of creation: 15 Sep 2003
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2003_025

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    Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
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    Keywords: Infrastructure; access regulation; competition law; antitrust; Bronner;

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    References

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    1. Gans, Joshua S, 2001. "Regulating Private Infrastructure Investment: Optimal Pricing for Access to Essential Facilities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 167-89, September.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, December.
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    Cited by:
    1. Aronsson, Thomas & Blomquist, Sören, 2004. "Redistribution and Provision of Public Goods in an Economic Federation," Working Paper Series 2004:4, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    2. Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar, 2004. "Taxation and Heterogeneous Preferences," Working Paper Series 2004:9, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.

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