Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence

Contents:

Author Info

  • Eklund, Johan E.

    ()
    (The Ratio Institute and Jönköping International Business School)

  • Poulsen, Thomas

    ()
    (Copenhagen Business School)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Shares with more voting rights than cash flow rights provide their owners with a disproportional influence that is often found to destroy the value of outside equity. This is taken as evidence of discretionary use of power. However, concentration of power does not necessarily result from control enhancing mechanisms; it could also be that some shareholders retain a large block in a one share-one vote structure. In this paper, we develop a methodology to disentangle disproportionality, which allows us to test the effect of deviations from one share-one vote more precisely. Our empirical findings add to the existing literature.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://ratio.se/media/67024/jee_tp_share-one.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by The Ratio Institute in its series Ratio Working Papers with number 162.

    as in new window
    Length: 28 pages
    Date of creation: 17 Dec 2010
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0162

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden
    Phone: 08-441 59 00
    Fax: 08-441 59 29
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.ratio.se/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Ownership structure; one share-one vote; proportionality; performance; entrenchment;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0162. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Martin Korpi).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.