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Skewed Norms under Peer Pressure: Formation and Collapse

Author

Listed:
  • Michaeli, Moti

    (Department of Economics, and Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University,)

  • Spiro, Daniel

    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

Abstract

This paper shows that peer pressure may lead to dynamic convergence to a norm that is skewed with respect to preferences in society, yet is endogenously upheld by the population. Moreover, a skewed norm will often be more sustainable than a representative norm. This may explain the skewness of various social and religious norms. By furthermore interpreting a norm as a political regime, we show that biased regimes can be sustained even without the existence of a powerful group with coherent interests. We analyze the pattern by which political regimes collapse and relate it to contemporary revolutions and mass protests.

Suggested Citation

  • Michaeli, Moti & Spiro, Daniel, 2014. "Skewed Norms under Peer Pressure: Formation and Collapse," Memorandum 15/2014, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2014_015
    as

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    File URL: http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2014/memo-15-2014.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    2. Rubin, Jared, 2014. "Centralized institutions and cascades," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 340-357.
    3. Robin Naylor, 1989. "Strikes, Free Riders, and Social Customs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(4), pages 771-785.
    4. Michaeli, Moti & Spiro, Daniel, 2013. "The Distribution of Individual Conformity under Social Pressure across Societies," Memorandum 12/2014, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Jo Thori Lind & Daniel Chen, 2016. "The Political Economy Of Beliefs: Why Fiscal And Social Conservatives/Liberals Come Hand-In-Hand," 2016 Meeting Papers 606, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Peer pressure; Social norm; Revolution; Protest movement; Alienation; Religion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
    • Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion

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