Kind, Hans Jarle () (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) Koethenbuerger, Marko () (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) Schjelderup, Guttorm () (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)
Abstract
A benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such revenue and welfare dominance does not hold in two-sided markets.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in its series Discussion Papers with number
2009/9.
Length: 8 pages Date of creation: 15 Sep 2009 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2009_009
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