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Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-sided Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Kind, Hans Jarle

    (Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH))

  • Koethenbuerger, Marko

    (Center for Economic Studies, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität)

  • Schjelderup, Guttorm

    (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)

Abstract

This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.

Suggested Citation

  • Kind, Hans Jarle & Koethenbuerger, Marko & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2008. "Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-sided Markets," Discussion Papers 2008/1, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2008_001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Delipalla, Sofia & Keen, Michael, 1992. "The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 351-367, December.
    2. Jean‐Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Two‐sided markets: a progress report," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, September.
    3. Hans Jarle Kind & Marko Köthenbürger & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2006. "Taxation in Two-Sided Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 1871, CESifo.
    4. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 990-1029, June.
    5. Auerbach, Alan J. & Hines, James Jr., 2002. "Taxation and economic efficiency," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 21, pages 1347-1421, Elsevier.
    6. Evans David S., 2003. "Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-19, September.
    7. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    8. Simon P. Anderson & Stephen Coate, 2005. "Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(4), pages 947-972.
    9. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1978. "Taxing price makers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 423-455, December.
    10. A. Michael Spence, 1975. "Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 417-429, Autumn.
    11. Jean-Charles Rochet Author-Email:rochet@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse & Jean Tirole Author-Email: tirole@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market Structure and Pricing; Efficiency; Optimal Taxation; Incidence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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