The Welfare State -- Background, Achievements, Problems
AbstractThis paper starts out with a brief discussion of the historical background, the justifications and the political forces behind the built up of the modern welfare state. It also summarizes its major achievements in terms of economic efficiency and redistribution. The paper also tries to identify some major problems of contemporary welfare-state arrangements, differentiating exogenous shocks from endogenous behaviour adjustments by individuals to the welfare state itself. The latter include tax distortions, moral hazard, and endogenous changes in social norms concerning work and benefit dependency.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 662.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 27 Feb 2006
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Justifications for Welfare State; Incentive Problems; Moral Hazard; Social Norms;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-03-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2006-03-25 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-PBE-2006-03-25 (Public Economics)
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