This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Continuous Model of Income Insurance

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Lindbeck, Assar () (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University)
Persson, Mats () (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University)
Abstract

We develop a simple yet realistic model of income insurance, where the individual’s ability and willingness to work is treated as a continuous variable. In this framework, income insurance not only provides income smoothing, it also relieves the individual from particularly burdensome work. As a result, the individual adjusts his labor supply in a continuous fashion to the implicit tax wedge of the insurance system. Moral hazard, in the sense that an individual receives insurance benefits without actually being fully qualified, also becomes a matter of degree. Moreover, our continuous framework makes it easy to analyze both the role of administrative rejection of claims, and the role of social norms, for the utilization of insurance.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.iies.su.se/publications/seminarpapers/756.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Jinfeng Ge) or (Ettore Panetti) or (David Seim)
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies in its series Seminar Papers with number 756.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 29 Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0756

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46-8-162000
Fax: +46-8-161443
Web page: http://www.iies.su.se/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Jinfeng Ge) or (Ettore Panetti) or (David Seim).

Related research
Keywords: Moral hazard; disability insurance; work absence; administrative rejection; asymmetric information; social norms;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Whinston, Michael D., 1983. "Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 49-71, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Brown, Sarah & Sessions, John G, 1996. " The Economics of Absence: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(1), pages 23-53, March.
  4. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  5. Diamond, Peter & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1995. "Economic aspects of optimal disability benefits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-23, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2003. "Designing Optimal Disability Insurance," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000217, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Stefania Albanesi & Christopher Sleet, 2006. "Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 73(1), pages 1-30, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Barmby, Tim & Sessions, John G & Treble, John G, 1994. " Absenteeism, Efficiency Wages and Shirking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 96(4), pages 561-66.
  10. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jšrgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms And Economic Incentives In The Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Moffitt, Robert, 1983. "An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 1023-35, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by providing information about publications in your institution.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.