Screening stringency in the disability insurance program
AbstractWe propose a strategy for assessing how the inflow to the disability insurance program has been governed over time. We analyze the ex-ante health of individuals entering the program, compared to individuals not entering the program in the same year, by using ex-post mortality. Applying the strategy to Sweden, we find large variation in the relative health of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries over time. Some of the fluctuations correspond well to formal changes to screening stringency. However, we also find large variation in health during periods when no changes to formal eligibility criteria have been pursued.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy in its series Working Paper Series with number 2013:10.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 02 May 2013
Date of revision:
Disability insurance; screening stringency; proportional hazard model;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2013-06-04 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2013-06-04 (Insurance Economics)
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