The Impact of a Break-Through Rule on European Firms
AbstractWe analyze the impact of a 75 pct. Break-Through rule on 1,035 European firms with dual class shares. In 3-5 pct. of the firms the controlling owners incur a direct loss of control, whereas in additional 11-17 pct. of the firms the controlling owners are likely to incur a control loss. Firms in Germany, Italy and the Scandinavian countries are more likely to incur a control loss. We continue to estimate the restrictions that the Break-Through rule puts on these firms’ ability to issue new shares to outsiders without changing the control structure. We conclude that a significant number of the firms with dual class shares in the European Union will be affected by a 75 pct. Break- Through rule.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 12-2002.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2002
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: 38 15 25 75
Fax: 38 15 34 99
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/
More information through EDIRC
Break-Through rule; Dual class shares; Corporate control; Takeovers and Voting rights;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-04-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2003-04-13 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-EEC-2003-04-13 (European Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998.
"Corporate Ownership Around the World,"
NBER Working Papers
6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1840, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
- Erik Berglöf & Mike Burkart, 2003. "European takeover regulation," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 18(36), pages 171-213, 04.
- Pajuste, Anete, 2005. "Determinants and consequences of the unification of dual-class shares," Working Paper Series 0465, European Central Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lars Nondal).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.